Activists: Misleading Ownership Stakes & Suspect Positioning Strategies

rosenstein cag

icahn fcx 21

Headline:
Front-Running 13D Disclosures: Something Is Very Wrong Here

*************************************

“Activist Investors”, the relatively new classification for corporate agitators, want you to believe that their intellectual tactics/strategies improve both corporate governance and shareholder returns.

That may be true but they also seem to be involved in another, less savory, tactic…that is inflating their claims of company “ownership” with extremely large, and extra-ordinarily short dated/price sensitive, derivatives positions.

The derivatives positions are, typically, not converted to common shares until AFTER the MARKET MOVING, COMPULSORY SEC 13D Disclosure Filings…usually/already deep “in the money”.

Nothing like a “free ride” on the back of the ignorant SEC.  Is it legal? Maybe/Maybe Not.

But it certainly does not “smell” right…as this exclusive breed of both newer and established “Activists”, unfortunately, perpetuate the idea that Wall St. is still = a “Den of Thieves”.

That SEC chief Mary Jo White, and her substantial staff of attorneys, have not taken notice of this loop-holed tactic also point to another glaring weakness = the federal government’s “asleep at the wheel” regulators.

*************************************

Two recently disclosed positions by “Activist” powerhouses JANA Partners and Carl Icahn will serve to illustrate this phenomenon. Of course, they are not the only firms/personas engaged in these controversial positioning techniques.

Any discussion of dicey, “Activist” trading tactics must also include Pershing Square’s Bill Ackman…he who built a very large stake in the “old” Allergan/AGN knowing, full well, that Valeant/VRX would be bidding to acquire the company. Somehow, in the SEC’s complicated and twisted legal morass, that maneuver was ironically considered both “kosher” and legal.

However this particular “post” will focus on JANA Partners’ place-holding in ConAgra Foods/CAG and Icahn’s footprint in Freeport McMoRan/FCX.

*************************************

First off…a little background on JANA/Icahn and their disclosure responsibilities to the SEC.

As of June 30, 2015 [13F Filings] JANA Partners, managed by Barry Rosenstein, managed a portfolio valued at $16.8B with Icahn’s equaling $31.2B. Further, the investment track records, for both, are very good…especially since the market trough in 2009…but even prior to that.

In addition to managing capital both JANA/Icahn must also tend to an array of mandated administrative tasks including public filing disclosures with the SEC. The quarterly Form 13F, in particular, is of keen interest to many industry observers.

This filing specifically reveals a fund’s portfolio composition [as of calendar quarter end]. For all to see… newly acquired positions/liquidated prior positions/existing positions trimmed or added to…punctuated by their dollar value. A true window into the portfolio…but it may be time lagged, to a maximum, by 6 Weeks/45 days…and, typically, not all AUM are subject to the 13F filing. However, in the cases of JANA and Icahn, the majority of the firms’ AUM are reflected in their respective filings.

Moreover…if any investor [including “Activist’s”] acquires 5% of the common equity outstanding [directly or indirectly], of a publicly traded company, it is required [at a minimum] to file an SEC Schedule 13D within ten days of crossing the 5% threshold.

It is also important to note that a firm can request an exemption from disclosure if a position is currently being acquired…as it could interrupt their accumulation pattern and price tolerance[s].

This “Schedule”, once filed with the SEC, immediately becomes publicly accessible. JANA’s 13D was disclosed on June 18, 2015 [5% threshold met on June 8] while Icahn revealed his 13D on August 27, 2015 [5% threshold met on August 17]. Both filings occurred after the close of regular trading hours and adhered to the SEC’s dubious “beneficial ownership” definitions.

*************************************

SEC’s DEFINITION OF BENEFICIAL OWNERSHIP:

The SEC, supposedly in the business of enforcing disclosure, seems to be running afoul of its own mandate. They’ve technically refined Webster’s “Ownership” as “Beneficial Ownership”…certainly loosening/stretching the intuitive definition as follows:

Beneficial Ownership =

Direct/Stock Ownership [D/SO]

+
In-Direct/Derivative Ownership [I/DO]

Despite being combined in the SEC’s “Beneficial Ownership” definition these two “ownership” sub-categories are quite different. Specifically, the typical rights accorded to D/SO i.e. voting and dividends are NOT accorded to I/DO.

Derivatives simply offer a trader/investor the RIGHT to future ownership/liquidation with a “hard” set of conditions/choices
[buy/sell, strike price & exercise/maturity dates]. Until/If that RIGHT is exercised the trader/investor actually does NOT own/is NOT “short” the underlying asset.

So the 13D’s [filed by Icahn’s and JANA’s legal clans] classifying “Ownership” stakes as 88M/31M shares of FCX/CAG [suggesting approximate capital commitments of $1.1B & $1B] respectively is, in reality, such a great distance from the truth that it is almost comical [see below].

*************************************

“OWNERSHIP” POSITIONS:

Icahn/FCX [at time of filing]

88M Shares Beneficially Owned
8.46% of FCX Common Shares Outstanding

52.011M = 5% Ownership Threshold [13D]

3.254M Shares = Directly Owned = Stock

80.402M Shares = In-Directly Owned = Forward Contracts
12M Shares = In-Directly Short = Put Options [implied long position]

4.344M Shares = *Unknown [Direct vs. Indirect?]*

JANA/CAG [at time of filing]

30.863M Shares Beneficially Owned
7.20% of CAG Common Shares Outstanding

21.352M = 5% Ownership Threshold [13D]

6.732M Shares = Directly Owned = Stock

19.032M Shares = Indirectly Owned = Call Options

5.099M Shares = *Unknown [Direct vs. In-Direct?]*
___________________________________________________________

*13D filings require disclosure of executed positions within the prior 60 days. Any “positioning” prior = no obligation to disclose.

For JANA, since the 13F [dated 3.31.15], did not reveal any prior position in CAG [unless they were exempted…as discussed above] it is likely the “Unknown” share quantities of 5.099M shares were “acquired” between April 1 and April 19.

Icahn’s “Unknown” share quantities are a little more complicated to track. There was no FCX position listed in the 13F dated 6.30.15 [unless they were exempted…as discussed above]. And despite the claim, in the 13D, of 80.402M shares owned through “Forward Contracts” [a very lightly regulated/regarded derivative] it was only possible to track 57.183M of those shares. Anyway I suppose if he says he owns the derivatives…then he probably does.

Similar to the forward contracts it was only possible to track 3.254M of those shares “Directly Owned”…though the document indicates a position of 7.596M shares. Again …I suppose if he says he owns the shares…then he probably does.*
_____________________________________________________

Consider please, the most important point of this mathematical detail…that Icahn’s initial [direct ownership position] was, possibly, just 3.254M shares [vs. the 88M ownership stake characterized in the 13D filing].

No matter…even if the “Unknown” classification of shares [from above] were entirely included as “Directly Owned” [as the filing “softly” indicates]…it still would equal just 21.38% of the 88M shares claimed as ownership.

As for JANA…their direct ownership position was, possibly, just 6.732M shares [vs. the claimed 30.863M shares characterized in the 13D filing].

And as with Icahn…even if the “Unknown” classification of shares [from above] were entirely included as “Directly Owned”…it would equate to just 38.33% of the 30.863M shares claimed as ownership. .

Another more direct way to assess this = without the large derivatives positions…the “Market Moving” 5% ownership threshold, in either case, would not have been met. Plainly …not even close. [more on this point later].

*************************************

A pundit may indicate…“You may not like the SEC’s beneficial ownership definitions but those ARE the current rules. Your “beef” is with the SEC…not Icahn/JANA. They’ve really done nothing wrong”. I suppose that is possible…while also noting that the current SEC “ownership” definition is exceptionally misleading and distorts the “spirit” of true ownership.

BUT THERE IS SO MUCH MORE TO THIS THAN JUST THE ARCANE/LEGAL EXAMINATION OF SECURITIES OWNERSHIP/DISCLOSURE MANDATES…ALBEIT IMPORTANT TO UNDERSTAND. THE REAL STORY, HOWEVER, BEGINS BELOW.

*************************************

Cornerstone Question #1 =

IF THE “ACTIVISTS” TRULY WISH TO ULTIMATELY/”DIRECTLY” OWN THE STOCK [AND INFLUENCE STRATEGIC COURSE AT A TARGETED COMPANY] THEN WHY THE LOPSIDED “FRONT END” POSITIONING IN DERIVATIVES?

1. The most obvious answer is that they are simply “trading” the 13D disclosures with the most price sensitive securities on the planet. So…a quick flip? It is possible…but unlikely.

Both JANA & Icahn have substantial records of legitimately pursuing economic/qualitative reforms at their target companies.

2. Perhaps, then, that the stock is just not liquid enough? In the cases of both CAG & FCX that is just a ridiculous thought. And, typically, if the stock is not too liquid then neither are the derivatives underlying the security.

Anyway, during JANA’s accumulation phase, CAG equity traded about 2M shares/$68M volume/value per/day and CAG is no small company = Enterprise Value = $26.2B comprised of approximately $18.9B [427M shares outstanding] of equity and $7.3B of Net Debt.

And, it appears, JANA was acquiring a position since the beginning of April…not filing with the SEC until June 18th [almost three entire months]. Positioning the common equity, during this extended time period, should not have been too challenging.

FCX was even easier to position than CAG [despite the more brief accumulation window from mid-July to mid-August]…as its liquidity was overwhelming [averaging about 30M shares/$330M traded volume/value per/day].

Actually the stock was in a virtual free-fall [down almost 40% during that time period] and, likely, could have easily been bought in the open market…without much detection…many “times over”.

And, for the record, its Enterprise Value = $31.5B comprised of approximately $12.5B [1.128B shares outstanding] of equity and $18.97B of Net Debt.

3. Another consideration is that derivatives positions, initially, require substantially less capital than core equities positions…but ultimately not…when/if exercised.

4. And then…if the expiration/maturity months are staggered it allows for a more gradual capital commitment. I suppose so.

Some of the above may be true but, even aggregated, are not a tremendously powerful argument for such a dislocated position in derivatives vis-a-vis the common equity.

And if the derivatives positions, for whatever reasons, are so attractive then why even buy any stock? [a point that Icahn seems to appreciate a whole lot more than JANA although, it seems, Rosenstein shares the general sentiment]

Now…to examine the specific positioning techniques.

*************************************

DERIVATIVE POSITIONING TACTICS:

Icahn:
The positioning in FCX [July 17 – August 21] is just a dizzying array of purchased “forward contracts” and the extremely questionable strategy of selling puts [as the true intent is to directly position long]. As noted above some stock [minimal quantities] was “directly” purchased.

Amazingly, or not, a portion of the derivatives were purchased on margin. From the filing…Part of the purchase price of such Shares was obtained through margin borrowing.

You have to love it. Derivatives Purchased On Margin. Hey…Why Not? And this is America’s future Treasury Secretary [as in Trump]?

Specifically, Icahn’s forward contracts and short put position offer great detail.

First of all, the “forward contracts” were purchased on just about every day he was transacting. Secondly, the three different contract strike prices [mostly far “out of the money”] are articulated. Thirdly, the share counts [underlying the forward contracts] are noted. Finally, it is stated that the contracts are length-ily dated to mature/expire in March 2017.

Plus, the filing indicates a closely dated maturity/expiration for the shorted put position of mid-September 2015.

JANA:
Rosenstein’s call option positions in CAG offer a less complex picture than Icahn [although no specific purchase dates were cited]. It appears the call options were predominantly “in the money” and closely dated to maturity [all within seven weeks after the 13D was disclosed…most much sooner.]

However JANA, unlike Icahn, elected not to utilize margin when building their options [and equity] positions. “Such Shares are held by the investment funds managed by JANA in cash accounts and none of the funds used to purchase the Shares reported herein as beneficially owned by JANA were provided through borrowings of any nature.

It also ought to be noted that JANA did not sell any put options. So “cleaner” than Icahn but still a very large derivatives position ahead of a significant disclosure.

*************************************

Cornerstone Question #2 =

A LARGE DERIVATIVES POSITION AHEAD OF A “MATERIAL” DISCLOSURE?

YES…but the “material” event, ironically, is not a company pronouncement about a transformative strategic initiative. The event, in these cases, is that the well regarded JANA/Icahn have simply announced 13D sized “ownership” stakes in two separate companies…with plans/attempts to increase shareholder value.

And that they utilize the SEC’s compulsory disclosure procedures to host/act as a conduit for their specious, market moving announcements…This is just SO CUNNING & YET…SO BRILLIANT.

*************************************

Cornerstone Question #3 =

IF NOT “THE DERIVATIVES FLIP” THEN WHAT IS THE SPECIFIC STRATEGY?

It is not as obvious as it seems but, still, relatively straight forward.

In a surprising twist it appears these quasi “Masters of the Universe” are, rather than bold and daring, just tremendously risk averse….so risk averse that, despite huge capital bases to draw from, they won’t fully commit to “directly” buying a stock they’ve targeted…until, what I’ve termed, the “Angle” comes about.

The “Angle”…the “Real Angle”, it seems, is to get the stock quickly moving in the direction of/exceed their derivative “strikes”. Of course…Right? Like any rational derivatives player they’ll certainly exercise their “right” to acquire the stock…but only when the market price exceeds their strike price[s]…deferring the uptake of any substantial capital “at risk” until there’s essentially “NO RISK”…as in an EXISTING PROFIT. And their spurious 13D disclosures are just the catalyst to help achieve that objective.

*************************************

And so the news “hits” the wires…the inevitable price surges occur: 10.43% for CAG on June 19, 2015 and 3.04% [28.66% the day prior as the information seemed to have leaked] for FCX on August 28, 2015.

Naturally the especially price sensitive derivatives contracts are immediately turbo charged…even though they’ll likely be exercised…as many are now massively “in the money”. The “out of the money” contracts automatically re-price much higher too…as that elusive “out of the money” feature suddenly seems almost attainable.

*************************************

In the case of JANA this dramatic price crossover feature [market price > strike price], not surprisingly, coincided with the 13D disclosure.

In the case of Icahn, although the 13D disclosure incrementally improved the values of his positions, the majority of the derivatives, were still “out of the money”…but, it seems, only due to their poorly selected [for now] strike price[s]. Still, certainly a good start [with some profitable “marks”]…but more work to be done.

So collectively…somewhat shrewd…but also tremendously slippery. Who wouldn’t want to either: exercise a massively “in the money” derivatives contract or own almost any derivative on a day[s] when the underlying security increases in value by 10.43%/28.46% +.

*************************************

They really do have it “covered”. Don’t they? In the VERY UNLIKELY/IMPROBABLE scenario of an immediate price move down, on a 13D disclosure date, their capital at risk is finite. In the LIKELY/USUAL scenario of a sharp price move higher their capital is favorably exposed…in a BIG WAY.

Almost sounds like an asymmetrical capital hedge. But despite the apt classification these positions are not intended to be hedged. They are intended to generate out-sized, positive returns because, as indicated in their 13D filings [including CAG/FCX], the targeted company’s share price is deemed “undervalued”…but, apparently, not “undervalued” enough to buy a lot of stock…just “undervalued” enough to buy a boatload of derivatives.

Because, with a deceptively large ownership position, the true formula they both seemed to adhere to [in these two cases] goes as follows:

1. Build an Equity-“Light”/”Derivative Heavy” Position In A Target Company.

2. File a Schedule 13D & Threaten To Serve As A Company Change Agent…To Move The Stock Price Up.

3. Only Commit “Majority” Capital When Your Derivatives Positions Are “In The Money”.

*************************************

And so, in the midst of all this, just where is SEC Chief Ma-Jo? I’m sure she’s probably “nodding off”, right now, at one of those endless afternoon policy meetings but I suggest she “wake up”… “pound” a Red Bull…and start paying attention.

JANA/Icahn seem to be straddling the razor’s edge of a very dangerous “accumulation” game built on both their own creativity and the ignorance[s] of the SEC.
Sure…the “soft dollar-ed” compensated lawyers have it “covered”, but occasionally, they are fallible.

Even though Ma-Jo still can’t determine how to “nail” those High Frequency Traders scalping for nano-pennies on just about every conceivable stock transaction [hint: start looking at Citadel] …perhaps she could examine the aggressive trading/positioning disclosures practiced by some “Activist” hedge funds? It may not “smell” right to her either…or, perhaps, it is more than just a foul smell?

BLACK BOX TRADING: WHY THEY ALL “BLOW-UP”

Headline:
“We Are All Doing The Same Thing.”

********************

I recently listened to a podcast with some all-star [there are awards for everything now] “Black Box” equity trader.

It was quite a “telling” interview & I thank him for his insights but I’d heard it all before.

His confidence was staggering considering the general unpredictability of the future and, of course, the equity markets.

He explained how he had completely converted from a generally unsuccessful, discretionary technical trading style to a purely quantitative and scientific trading mode. He seemed to be so excited that his models, according to him, were pretty much “bullet proof”.

Having had more than just some tangential experience with black box modeling and trading myself I thought…you know…some people will just never learn.

********************

You see some years ago I was particularly focused on quantitative investing. Basically, “screw” the fundamentals and exclusively concentrate on price trends/charts and cross security/asset correlations [aka “Black Box” trading]. I was fascinated with the process and my results were initially stellar [high absolute returns with Sharpe Ratios > 2.0]. And, after looking at the regression data many others agreed. I was in high demand. So I “made the rounds” in Manhattan and Greenwich to a group of high profile hedge funds. It was a very exciting time for me as the interest level was significant.

As it turned out I had the good fortune of working with one of the world’s largest and best performing hedge funds. Their black box modeling team had been at it for years…back-testing every conceivable variable from every perceived angle…twisted/contorted in every measurable manner…truly dedicated to the idea that regression tested, quantitative trading models were the incremental/necessary “edge” to consistently generate alpha while maximizing risk-adjusted, absolutely positive returns. We worked together for some time and I became intimately involved with their quantitative modeling/trading team…truly populated with some of the best minds in the business.

While in Greenwich Ct. one afternoon I will never forget a conversation I had with a leading quantitative portfolio manager. He said to me that despite its obvious attributes “Black Box” trading was very tricky. The algorithms may work for a while [even a very long while] and then, inexplicably, they’ll just completely “BLOW-UP”.

To him the most important component to quantitative trading was not the creation of a good model. To him, amazingly, that was a challenge but not especially difficult. The real challenge, for him, was to “sniff out” the degrading model prior to its inevitable “BLOW-UP”. And I quote his humble, resolute observation because, you know, eventually they ALL blow-up…as most did in August 2007.

It was a “who’s who” of legendary hedge fund firms that had assembled “crack” teams of “Black Box” modelers: Citadel, Renaissance, DE Shaw, Tudor, Atticus, Harbinger and so many Tiger “cubs” including Tontine [not all strictly quantitative but, at least, dedicated to the intellectual dogma]…all preceded by Amaranth in 2006 and the legendary Long Term Capital Management’s [picking up pennies in front of a steam-roller] demise one decade earlier.

Years of monthly returns with exceedingly low volatility were turned “inside out” in just 4-6 weeks as many funds suffered monthly losses > 20% which was previously considered highly improbable and almost technically impossible…and, voila…effectively, a sword was violently thrust through the heart of EVERY “Black Box” model. VaR and every other risk management tool fell victim to legitimate liquidity issues, margin calls and sheer human panic.

Many of these firms somehow survived but only by heavily gating their, previously lightly-gated, quarterly liquidity provisions. Basically, as an investor, you could not “get out” if you wanted to. These funds changed the liquidity rules to suit their own needs…to survive…though many did fail.

********************

Anyway…to follow up on my dialogue with the esteemed portfolio manager…I asked why do they all “BLOW-UP”? What are those common traits that seem to effect just about every quantitative model despite the intellectual and capital fire-power behind them? And if they all eventually “BLOW-UP” then why are we even doing this?”

He answered the second part of the question first…and I paraphrase…“We are all doing this because we can make a lot of money BEFORE they “BLOW-UP”. And after they do “BLOW-UP” nobody can take the money back from us.

He then informed me why all these models actually “BLOW-UP”. “Because despite what we all want to believe about our own intellectual unique-ness, at its core, we are all doing the same thing. And when that occurs a lot of trades get too crowded…and when we all want to liquidate [these similar trades] at the same time…that’s when it gets very ugly.“. I was so naive. He was so right.

********************

Exactly What Were We All Doing?

We all knew what the leaders wanted and, of course, we wanted to please them. Essentially they wanted to see a model able to generate 4-6% annual returns [seems low, I know, but I’ll address that later]…with exceptionally low volatility, slim draw-down profiles and winning months outweighing the losing months by about 2:1. They also wanted to see a model trading exceptionally liquid securities [usually equities].

Plus the model, itself, had to be completely scientific with programmable filtering and execution [initiation and liquidation] features so that it could be efficiently applied and, more importantly, stringently back-tested and stress-tested . Long or short did not really matter. Just make money within the parameters. Plus, the model had to be able to accommodate at least $100M [fully invested most of the time as cash was not an option] and, hopefully, much more capital. This is much easier said than done but, given the brainpower and financial resources, was certainly achievable.

This is what all the “brainpower” learned…eventually.

First of all, a large number of variables in the stock selection filter meaningfully narrowed the opportunity set…meaning, usually, not enough tickers were regularly generated [through the filter] to absorb enough capital to tilt the performance meter at most large hedge funds…as position size was very limited [1-2% maximum]. The leaders wanted the model to be the hero not just a handful of stocks. So the variables had to be reduced and optimized. Seemingly redundant indicators [for the filter] were re-tested and “tossed” and, as expected, the reduced variables increased the population set of tickers…but it also ramped the incremental volatility…which was considered very bad. In order to re-dampen the volatility capital limits on portfolio slant and sector concentration, were initiated. Sometimes market neutral but usually never more than net 30% exposure in one direction and most sectors could never comprise more than 5% of the entire portfolio. We used to joke that these portfolios were so neutered that it might be impossible for them to actually generate any meaningfully positive returns. At the time of “production” they actually did seem, at least as a model, “UN-BLOW-UP-ABLE” considering all the capital controls, counter correlations and redundancies.

Another common trait of these models that was that, in order to minimize volatility, the holding periods had to be much shorter than a lot of us had anticipated. So execution [both initiation and liquidation] became a critical factor. Back then a 2-3 day holding period was considered acceptable, but brief, although there were plenty of intra-day strategies…just not at my firm…at least not yet. With these seemingly high velocity trading models [at the time], price slippage and execution costs, became supreme enemies of forecasted returns. To this day the toughest element to back-testing is accessing tick data and accurately pinpointing execution prices. Given this unpredictability, liberal price slippage was built into every model…and the model’s returns continued to compress…not to mention the computer time charges assessed by the leadership [which always pissed me off].

So, given all of this, what types of annual returns could these portfolios actually generate? A very good model would generate a net 5-7%…but 3.5-5% was acceptable too. So how then could anybody make any real money especially after considering the labor costs to construct/manage/monitor these models…which…BTW…was substantial?

Of course there was only one real way…although it would incrementally cut into performance even more, in the near term, but ultimately pay off if the “live” model performed as tested. The answer = LEVERAGE…and I mean a lot of it…as long as the volatility was low enough.

Back-tested volatility was one thing and live model volatility was another thing so leverage was only, ever so slowly, applied…but as time passed and the model performed, the leverage applied would definitely increase. Before you knew it those 5% returns were suddenly 20-25% returns as the positive beauty of leverage [in this case 4-5x] was unleashed.

********************

Fast forward 10 years and the objectives of hedge funds are still the same. Generate positive absolute returns with low volatility…seeking the asymmetrical trade…sometimes discretionary but in many cases these “Black Box” models still proliferate. And BTW…they are all “doing the same thing“…as always…current iteration = levered “long” funds.

What has changed though is the increased dollars managed by these funds [now > $3.5T] and the concentration, of these dollars, at the twenty largest funds [top heavy for sure]. What has also considerably changed is the cost of money…aka leverage. It is just so much cheaper…and, of course, is still being liberally applied but, to reiterate, in fewer hands.

Are these “hands” any steadier than they were ten years ago? I suppose that is debate-able but my bet is that they are not. They are still relying on regression-ed and stress tested data from the past [albeit with faster computers & more data]. They may even argue that their models are stronger due to the high volatility markets of ’08/’09 that they were able to survive and subsequently measure, test and integrate into their current “Black Boxes”…further strengthening their convictions…which is the most dangerous aspect of all.

Because…

1. Strong Conviction…aka Over Confidence +

2. Low Volatility +

3. High Levels/Low Costs of Leverage [irrespective of Dodd-Frank] +

4. More Absolute Capital at Risk +

5. Increased Concentration of “At Risk” Capital +

6. “Doing the Same Thing”

…Adds up to a Combustible Market Cocktail.

Still a catalyst is needed and, as always, the initial catalyst is liquidity [which typically results in a breakdown of historic correlations as the models begin to “knee-bend”…and the perceived safety of hedges is cast in doubt] followed by margin calls [the ugly side of leverage…not to mention a whole recent slew of ETF’s that are plainly levered to begin with that, with the use of borrowed money, morph into “super-levered” financial instruments] and concluding with the ever ugly human panic element [in this case the complete disregard for the “black box” models even after doubling/trebling capital applied on the way down because the “black box” instructed you to]. When the “box” eventually gets “kicked to the curb”…that is when the selling ends…but not after some REAL financial pain.

********************

So can, and will, this really occur once again? It can absolutely occur but it is just impossible to know exactly when…although there are plenty of warning signs suggesting its likelihood…as there have been for some time.

However, I am quite confident of the following:

1. The Fed Is Clueless On All Of This
[just too many moving parts for them…they cannot even coordinate a simple “cover-up” of leaked monetary policy…so no way the academics can grasp any of this…just liked they missed LTCM. Nor it seems…do they have any interest in it as it is too tactical for a strategically inclined central banker].

More Importantly Though

2. “Eventually They ALL Blow-Up”

3. The Only Real Question Left To Answer =
HOW BIG CAN THIS POSSIBLE “BLOW-UP” ACTUALLY BE?

If The Pieces Simultaneously Shudder…Then Pretty BIG.